How Currency Dealer Nodilo Brought Down Rijeka Bank and Shook the State

In the morning, lines of depositors began to grow, and Rijeka’s Korzo and Fiumara echoed with the same question: Where has the money gone? The news that a massive currency deficit had been discovered at Rijeka Bank struck the financial system like lightning. The name that quickly made headlines was — Eduard Nodilo, a currency dealer whose positions would soon total tens of millions of dollars. He would soon become a symbol of one of the largest banking scandals in independent Croatia.

‘Open’ dealing and lowered barriers

According to what would later be detailed in court documents and newspaper reconstructions, Nodilo accumulated losses from October 1997 to March 2002 by making deals in the international currency market, while concealing part of the deficit with deposits and false postings. The model was dangerous because it opened the door to risky speculation with contracts that had no firm limits, while oversight was too weak to detect them in time. In total, the damage reached about 97–100 million dollars.

In those days in March 2002, nerves and phones were fraying: the Croatian National Bank (HNB) was urgently convening meetings, politicians were trying to calm the market, and shareholders were suffering from falling prices and eroded trust. The bank, pressured by deposit withdrawals, was literally sinking day by day. The state — after dramatic deliberations — returned to ownership of the bank to prevent a broader system shock and protect depositors. The then-owner, Bayerische Landesbank, returned 60 percent of the shares to the state for a symbolic price of one euro. It was then taken over by Erste&Steiermärkische Bank, and under that name, Rijeka Bank has operated since 2003.

Who was the man at the center of the storm

The media described Nodilo as a quiet, exceptionally intelligent professional, a man who had worked for years in the dealing room and enjoyed trust. But it was precisely in that combination of trust, authority, and weak procedures that a dangerous crack lay: the front office was separating from control and the back office, and oversight of daily open positions and limits was inadequate. When the deficit broke through the dam, the question was no longer how it was possible, but who failed to see it — the dealer, the superior, the management, the auditors, or the system.

Investigation, trials, and verdicts

The investigation lasted for years. In the spring of 2006, the main trial began — the largest economic trial of that era, with a file of over 60,000 pages. The indictment charged Nodilo and several others in the bank on six counts, including entering into harmful contracts and falsifying and concealing actual positions.

The final epilogue for Eduard Nodilo came in 2009: initially, he received a unique sentence of 7.5 years in prison, with an obligation to compensate the legal successor of the bank in the amount of 96 million dollars. It is crucial that the court established a pattern of continuous loss generation, violation of limits, and unauthorized withdrawal of deposits.

In the summer of 2013, Nodilo was released on parole after nearly six years in prison. After that, he was not seen in public. He died at the age of 74 on February 12, 2026.

Business consequences: the end of an era

Rijeka Bank — once a regional pride and economic service — ended up in the hands of a stronger owner (the current legal successor) after state intervention. This move saved clients but also symbolized the end of an era: from that moment, the era of large domestic banks practically ceased in Croatia; the system entered a period of dominance by international groups, stricter internal controls, and a more conservative approach to market risks.

Regulatory and cultural lessons

The scandal left a deeper mark than a single balance sheet. First, it showed that risk organization is as important as talent in the dealing room: without strict limits, segregation of duties, and independent control, talent can become a detonator. Second, it confirmed that trust in banks lives on a thin membrane of information — one bad morning news is enough for lines in front of counters. Third, it forced the entire sector to professionalize: daily position reconciliations, real-time reporting, the ‘four-eyes principle’, and a culture where asking questions is an obligation, not a nuisance. All of this sounds standard today — it was not in 2002.

Epilogue, years later

Nodilo was the only one convicted in the scandal that brought down the bank and shook public trust. In addition to him, three other managers and two clerks were charged. All of them, including the then CEO Ivan Štokić, were acquitted of all charges.

However, it was a case that reshaped Croatian banking: the rescue of deposits and system stability led to faster consolidations, stronger oversight by the HNB, and the lesson that risk cannot be ‘fixed tomorrow’. That day in March 2002 remains a reminder that banks are not only brought down by bad loans — they are also brought down by poor controls.