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Croatia’s Foreign Policy Maneuvering Space is Very Limited

It is not a good sign, but it is not the biggest problem for Croatia that the President of the Republic (Milanović) and the Prime Minister (Plenković) cannot fly on the same plane to Dubrovnik or Podgorica. If they were to strictly adhere to security protocols, they should not be flying on the same plane. The bigger problem is that they speak (and sometimes act) differently or even contrary about the same issues, fueling the impression of a complete division in Croatian foreign policy.

Thus, a few days after the defense ministers of Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo signed a declaration on defense cooperation, as a sort of defense-security response to the project of the Russian-Serbian world, President Milanović, during an official visit to Montenegro as the most delicate target of the ‘Serbian world’ (due to NATO membership), remained silent on the pure Serbian narrative of the pro-Serbian leadership of Montenegro regarding the war for a Greater Serbia in the 1990s. However, on that occasion, he publicly insulted the EU, criticized the Prime Minister Plenković for participating in the ‘coalition of the willing’ summit, trivializing once again the Russian security-defense threat to Europe. Plenković, on the other hand, at the European ‘coalition of the willing’ summit, repeats the phrase about a just peace in Ukraine based on international law, from which even Zelensky has already withdrawn. He publicly analyzes U.S. President Trump, who, according to Plenković, is more interested in becoming a peacemaker than in ensuring that peace is just. And he repeats the absurdity about the readiness to transfer Croatian experiences from the reintegration of the Danube region to Ukraine. And so, word against word, the impression of a cacophony in Croatian foreign policy arises.

There is no need for emphasis

But that is not the worst part. Despite the unpleasant impression, almost no one in the Western political world takes Milanović’s words seriously, there are almost no contacts there, and the Eastern world is not of particular practical help either. As far as is known, even Donald Trump does not start his day by reading Plenković’s peace messages and recommendations. The worst part of this toxic relationship between Milanović and Plenković is that Croatian foreign policy has been reduced to a conflict and competition between two egos at a time when it is necessary to recognize, accept, and advocate for several fundamental national priorities that would make Croatia safer. It could even benefit from these changes.

If it adheres to its fundamental strategic orientation defined by NATO and EU membership, Croatia’s foreign policy maneuvering space is very limited, and the options it can choose from are very simple. With its political weight, Croatia does not even enter the second circle of European countries that could potentially influence some conditions of the U.S.-Russian peace arrangement for Ukraine. This means that Croatian foreign policy, in the military-political aspects of the peace process, must follow the mainstream NATO, as the process is in the hands of the U.S., and European defense and security will depend on the U.S. for a long time, no matter what Trump does and no matter what anyone thinks of him. In the economic-political aspects of the process (sanctions policy), it should follow the mainstream EU. However, there is no need for the highest Croatian state officials to publicly elaborate and specify their positions on this process or to particularly stand out.

A step in the right direction

However, they should be much more active and visible in contributing to regional stability and security. Croatia should use its strongest asset – LNG in Krk and the network of new gas pipelines – to strengthen its partnership with the U.S., on which the defense and security of Southeast Europe still depend, where energy will continue to play a key role. It should ensure the principle of inviolability of borders by strengthening defense capacities, not through empty talk. And in no way should it encourage harmful alliances for Croatia with political delinquents like Milorad Dodik. In this context, the declaration of Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo is a step in the right direction. In this context, it is extremely important that the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy (still in an acting capacity) Laura Lochman chose Croatia for her first foreign policy visit.

However, it is not a good sign that her visit and conversation with Minister of Energy Šušnjar passed almost completely under the radar in Croatian public life. Plenković and Milanović, from opposing positions, publicly dealt with Ukrainian peace and international law, the freedoms of the Russian army, criticisms of the EU, and other major topics during those days. Minister Šušnjar may have kneaded the dough for too long while holding a course of austerity. This is when you perceive (foreign) policy as a pose and a stage, disregarding the content. And you miss opportunities.