Vlatko Cvrtila: America Will Certainly Pursue a Policy That Is Separate from European Interests

As this year progresses, anyone who thought that the geopolitical landscape would be a bit calmer than in the previous few years has proven to be naive. The most anticipated geopolitical event of 2024 – the American presidential elections – has been further fueled by the assassination of Donald Trump, followed by the withdrawal of current President Joe Biden from the race. According to expectations, whoever wins in November and enters the White House will not be particularly favorable to Europe. At the same time, the Old Continent continues to feel increasing pressure from Russian aggression against Ukraine. How should Europe position itself in the new geopolitical constellation of power, is there hope for sustainable peace in Ukraine, and what does China want from Europe? We discussed this with prominent geopolitical expert Vlatko Cvrtila, rector of VERN University and professor at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb.

In mid-June, a defense agreement was signed between North Korea and Russia in Pyongyang. How do you interpret this move?

The signing of this defense agreement would not have occurred if it were not for Russian aggression against Ukraine, or if Russia were not the main driver of the revision of international relations aimed at undermining Western dominance. For years, Russia, like the vast majority of UN member states, adhered to the regime of sanctions and isolation of North Korea, which is a kind of rogue state in the international system.

Such a relationship between North Korea and Russia was expected as they have developed intense cooperation since the Russian aggression against Ukraine, in which Pyongyang supplies Russia with artillery and missile ammunition, and in return, among other things, receives technology and support for launching spy military satellites. The agreement increases the likelihood of even more aggressive behavior from North Korea in the future and introduces a new variable into the complex regional security environment. It should be noted that this agreement also opens the possibility of transferring some technologies from China through North Korea to Russia, allowing China to avoid secondary sanctions.

Shortly after the signing of this agreement, the North Korean regime announced the sending of an engineering unit that would participate in reconstruction efforts in the Ukrainian territory under Russian control. Are we talking about a new level of escalation of this conflict, and does this give justification to Western countries to intervene directly, such as the announcements of the possibility of sending French soldiers?

Pyongyang’s announcement of sending soldiers to occupied Ukrainian territories gives this conflict a new dimension that opens the space for similar moves by countries supporting Ukraine. However, unlike a dictatorship that does not have to account to the public for its moves, Western countries will think carefully before making such a decision. After all, there are already difficulties in the speed of sending weapons and military equipment to Ukraine, often due to internal political circumstances in some countries, or the attitudes of their political elites. Therefore, this announcement from Pyongyang will not automatically trigger a decision from Western countries to send their soldiers to Ukraine.

If a situation arises that requires the activation of provisions from this mutual military assistance agreement, will there be automatic activation, or will Russia opportunistically assess whether protecting North Korea is in its interest at that moment?

I believe that Russia will behave opportunistically, assessing the situation and context. It is hard to find a historical example where great powers acted as protectors of small states that were threatened without considering their own interests. I will only mention the case of Armenia. It is hard to imagine that Russia would react in favor of North Korea without taking its own interests into account.

President Putin presented what he called a ‘peace proposal’ in early June, which is essentially a call for Ukraine to surrender. In your opinion, how will the future dynamics of the conflict in Ukraine unfold, especially in the West-Russia relationship?

Russian aggression against Ukraine is definitely the beginning of changes in the international order. This order, after the collapse of the Cold War, was predominantly influenced by Western military, security, political, and economic structures and ideologies. Russia had already been oriented towards resisting Western dominance and revising that order, as was China. Tensions had emerged in the political and economic spheres, and occasionally in the military, but everything occurred in relatively controlled competitive conditions without major surprises.

The intervention in Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 showed how the game enters new forms whose consequences are difficult to remedy through diplomacy, as has ultimately been shown. The reaction to the intervention in Georgia was relatively lukewarm, and after the annexation of Crimea, it was stronger, but again without effect on Russia’s behavior, which openly attacked Ukraine after the covert aggression in 2014 with ‘little green men’, which was an act of undermining the global order and opening a new period in international relations. Currently, two opposing sides can be identified in that order: Western countries that support Ukraine and countries that have not condemned the aggression and assist Russia in various ways. There is also a third group of countries from the so-called Global South that believe this is exclusively a European regional conflict that has little to do with them.

The division of the world was most clearly seen in the attempt to organize a peace conference in Switzerland, where China and Russia made great efforts to limit the success or reach of that conference. It was immediately clear that this conference could not bring peace, but it was supposed to send a clear message from the majority of the world’s countries about what they think of the aggression against Ukraine. The West did everything to ensure that this conference achieved some success. It can be said that the result was relatively unresolved. Before the start of the conference, President Putin ‘covered’ its potential achievements with his peace proposal, which was practically a call for Ukraine’s surrender.

Recently, Russia has often emphasized that it is ready for negotiations, for now under its conditions, and Putin adds that there is no one to negotiate with because Zelensky is no longer the legitimate president of Ukraine after his term has expired. It is questionable how ready Russia is for negotiations regardless of its constant emphasis on its proposals. A key turning point towards negotiations will likely be Ukraine’s decision to allow Russia to participate in future peace conferences, which could also lead to new direct negotiations between Ukraine and Russia.

Can we interpret Putin’s calls for negotiations, where he sets the condition of lifting all Western sanctions, as a sign of Russia’s fatigue with this war, or even its weakness?

After two and a half years, there is likely a certain level of fatigue, social, political, economic, and even military. However, regimes like the Russian one will not admit this, and any attempt at internal resistance to further warfare will be very effectively prevented. The condition of lifting sanctions is unfeasible at this moment, and if it becomes one of the elements for achieving peace, sanctions will not be lifted overnight. The West will certainly not give up all sanctions, as that would mean rewarding the aggressor. This is completely contrary to what the tools of pressure on states that have disrupted the international order were.

However, other points from Putin’s proposal are also impossible to realize without a military victory. If this were truly a serious proposal to stop the aggression, it could be viewed as setting a high initial price to reach a sustainable compromise that would satisfy Russian interests during negotiations. Ukraine also has maximum conditions; the question is only what those points of compromise would be that would not disrupt the UN Charter, the European and international order, and that would not lead to a long-term frozen conflict with great potential for re-eruption.

Is a compromise that would yield a sustainable peace solution currently impossible?

From this Russian proposal, a neutral status for Ukraine could potentially be realized. After all, this has been on the table before. This would eliminate the fear of NATO on Russia’s border, which Moscow constantly emphasizes, although with the accession of the Baltic states to NATO, it is already on Russia’s border. However, for numerous geostrategic, political, and even historical reasons, Russia cannot allow Ukraine to be fully in the Western sphere of influence.

Russia wants a neutral and poorly armed Ukraine, which could mean that it will again be easy prey in the future. A compromise could be reached around delaying the decision on Ukraine’s NATO membership for a number of years, but the surrender of all four Ukrainian regions is completely unacceptable for Ukraine at this moment. On the other hand, the military expulsion of Russian forces from the entire territory of Ukraine in a short time seems unlikely.

The surrender of all four regions would also be humiliating.

Absolutely. At this moment, we are paying too much attention to what is happening on the battlefield and too little to what is happening in Ukrainian politics and society. This would certainly strengthen radical forces in Ukrainian society, in terms of exclusive hostility towards Russia. This would lead to the formation of political platforms that would seek the return of that territory, and this would mean that Ukraine would find itself in a situation of strengthening radical political platforms and potentially jeopardizing the democratization processes that are a prerequisite for integration into Western associations, i.e., support from the West.

In the last European Parliament elections, we witnessed the rise of right-wing and populist parties. Is this a consequence of a certain fatigue of the European public with the conflict in Ukraine?

What happened in the European elections is not particularly dramatic, although it is alarming. Public opinion polls before the elections indicated a greater strengthening of the right. Traditional parties, primarily the European People’s Party, performed better than in the previous elections, socialists lost some seats, and the biggest drop occurred in the liberal grouping where French parliamentarians from Macron’s political platform had a significant influence. This is a consequence of the specific internal political situation in France. It is hard to believe that a right-wing political bloc will form in the European Parliament that will decisively influence European policies, as there are serious differences among them. However, cooperation is likely to occur on some issues, which should not be overly concerning.

I am more concerned about the lack of leadership in the European Union, as we are surrounded by major challenges. The next five years will be crucial for the European Union to define itself in a global context, and I do not only mean the fear of the outcome of the presidential elections in the US. Biden’s and Trump’s policies towards Europe are not significantly different. The US will certainly, regardless of who wins in November, pursue a policy that is separate from European interests. This is a kind of historical break that will lead to Europe, if it does not define its strategy, entering a period of declining global power, and even a decline in economic power, which is the foundation of overall European power. In this sense, I am quite concerned about the direction we will take.

Is Europe in a vicious circle; in a multilateral world, it will lose importance, and the prerequisite for strengthening on a global level is deeper integration, which is currently not possible?

Yes, we can say that. At this moment, it is difficult to recognize what would lead to better functioning of the European Union, or to identify what its strategic interests are and how to achieve them. However, the world is changing, and the globalization we know will no longer be a process that generates benefits only for some. The world will likely be more regionally structured in the coming decades. I see an opportunity for Europe to finally realize this, to not strive for strategic concepts of global power or to create some kind of balance of power, but to turn inward and pay attention to what is happening in the immediate European environment.