The first Croatian government after the multi-party elections in 1990 had a Ministry of Emigration. Its purpose was to enable emigrated Croats to return to Croatia and assist them in integration. The task seemed easy, as the Croatian diaspora in overseas countries and in Western European states was, according to estimates, numerically close to the number of Croats in Croatia, and socially very diverse: from truly serious entrepreneurs in overseas countries (both Americas, Australia), to owners of small and medium-sized enterprises in European countries, managers, and scientists, to workers and retirees…
At a time when freedom was celebrated across Europe after the collapse of communist regimes, when Croatia was moving towards achieving its statehood, it was logical to include Croats from the diaspora in these changes – to help with their business experience, knowledge, and money. And for those who had to leave for political reasons, to assist in their return. The first minister for emigration was a returnee from Canada – Gojko Šušak. Later, as a wartime minister, Šušak proved to be a minister of duty: he succeeded in creating an army under wartime conditions, arming it under an arms import embargo, and establishing a crucial alliance with the USA… He did this largely in cooperation with the Croatian diaspora, which helped both financially and through influence. However, the project of returning the diaspora has remained an unfulfilled task to this day. Can the Ministry of Demography and Emigration, which was established at the initiative of the DP as a smaller government partner, change this?
The Doors Were Never Truly Open
Very simply – this is not a question of the existence of a ministry, but of the existence of political will. Precisely due to the lack of that political will, there was no organized and state-supported return of the diaspora, as was the case in the 1990s in Estonia or later in Ireland, where returnees were the drivers of new development. Regardless of whether they left for the ‘world’ due to downy mildew, economic, or political reasons, the old ruling structures always perceived the Croatian diaspora as hostile. Or at least as a competitor in the division of influence in politics and in an economy dependent on politics. Even during the creation and defense of the state, when the ties between Croatia and the diaspora were at their peak, they knew how to take money from the diaspora, exploit its influence, and discourage return. After 2000, this turned into open hostility, which then grew into feigned friendship. But the doors were never truly open. Special care was taken to ensure that the ‘intruder’ from the diaspora did not take a part of the political power.
