The latest HRejting survey, which measures party popularity, was conducted precisely during the days when HDZ’s county chief Damir Dekanić was arrested. Last year, according to the relevant authorities, he caused a traffic accident while drunk and then attempted to cover up his involvement. Three police officers who assisted him were also taken into custody. The result: HDZ’s popularity even increased by 0.35 percent on a monthly basis, so after six years in power, the party has the highest support (26.1 percent). This once again demonstrates the absurdity that corruption, nepotism, and (party) cronyism are not politically and socially relevant topics when it comes to Croatia.
This phenomenon can be approached superficially, with salon-style outrage. But it is more useful to try to view the plague from multiple angles, with a cool head, unburdened by the obvious truths about the harmfulness of bribery, favoritism towards relatives, friends, or party colleagues.
It is easiest to thump one’s chest and declare: ‘I am for zero tolerance towards these phenomena.’ And it is clear that this means nothing in reality. Corruption, nepotism, and cronyism (CNC) exist in all countries. A strong correlation between the level of GDP per capita and the level of CNC could certainly be easily proven. The more developed a country is, the less corruption there is. Since Croatia ranks at the bottom of the EU member states in terms of GDP, it can be expected to have a relatively highest level of corruption.
A Century-Old Habit
If corruption, nepotism, and cronyism could be objectively measured, it would be possible to determine a reduction to the desired level. The rankings that appear have a serious shortcoming. They are only about the perception of those surveyed. I have also participated in such surveys. But I have no experience in other countries. My rating from one to five was entirely subjective. It would be relevant to survey only those who have personal experience working in at least five transitional countries, thus obtaining a more objective and usable table.
When it comes to the perception of Croatia, extremes prevail: a) it all came from socialism or b) everything is the fault of the transition and the last thirty years. However, there are many historical sources that confirm a high propensity for corruption, nepotism, and cronyism for centuries. The forms and amounts during socialism were lower due to social ownership, but with the return to capitalism, the scales returned to old levels. The lighter came with the first banks and acquirers from Austria. And the team that took power did not need much persuasion and teaching.
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Currently, a catch-22 is in play. Without reducing corruption, nepotism, and cronyism, a significant part of the country’s development potential is nullified. This might change with the opposition winning the elections. But voters do not respond to promises of reducing corruption, nepotism, and cronyism. Those fifty percent of eligible voters who do not go to the polls have at least ten times indicated that the topic of corruption will not lead them to the ballot boxes. Realizing the reality, the business community has accepted that corruption, nepotism, and cronyism are given sizes.
Theoretically, the solution to the catch-22 would be to place this topic among priorities of Andrej Plenković’s government. But since this is not a decisive electoral topic, and is very inconvenient within the party, there is little chance that such a turnaround will occur. And even if a miracle were to happen in the upcoming parliamentary elections, it is unlikely that any opposition coalition would be able to quickly deal with the solid institutional network that has formed during HDZ’s years in power.
The Quadrature of the Circle
Now someone might say that there are examples of cities (Zagreb, Split) where new authorities have come in and there is evidence that things have indeed changed. For now, this seems accurate. But it is not the same to master institutions and connections at the city level and at the state level. Cities do not have police, judiciary, large state-owned companies, regulators, mega-ministries… all the fortresses that exist at the state level under their jurisdiction. The last time the SDP was in power, four years were not enough for ministers to master the inherited apparatus.
All in all, the prospects for reducing corruption, nepotism, and cronyism to a more appropriate measure are not great. Civil society institutions, EU control bodies, and independent media can exert some pressure. It is not much, but that is the reality of a stuck community.
As politically and morally incorrect as it may sound, given the other unchanged circumstances, those who wish to contribute to progress should engage intellectual and professional capacities to play out development programs that would treat the existing level of corruption, nepotism, and cronyism as a short-term unchangeable variable.
