It is estimated that the exchange rate of the kuna, which is retiring after all these years, was at least 10 percent overvalued, which benefited importers and made exports more difficult. The exchange rate injustice became so notorious that even the most hardened exporters stopped complaining and accepted it as a necessary evil. However, the true strength of the Croatian currency was demonstrated during privatization, when skilled entrepreneurs close to the authorities could buy an entire factory for just one kuna. Thus, we overnight lost the strongest currency in the world. In the first second of this year, we also lost monetary sovereignty, but we did not feel it because we had not used it until now.
The kuna was firmly tied to the euro – in the last five years, the exchange rate fluctuated by 1.6 percent up and down, and in the last year by only about 0.7 percent. This connection enabled the breaking of hyperinflation in 1994, but limited the fight against current price increases that the entire eurozone is feeling.
The transition to the euro is marked by price increases. The infamous ‘rounding‘ of prices has caused the price of bread in some places to jump from seven kunas to one euro, a pack of cigarettes is 30 to 40 lipa more expensive. Retail chains are fishing in troubled waters. Butter sold for 2.89 euros (21.77 kunas) recently had a price of 13.59 kunas. Another chain boasted that it rounded all prices in euros down, but immediately faced accusations that it had raised some prices by about 20 percent just a few days ago. The Prime Minister angrily tweets and lines up inspectors, while his small economy minister summons traders and threatens blacklists and price freezes. The inspectors readily respond and boast that they have discovered 51 cases of selling food products above the maximum allowed price. The state has also prescribed fines of up to 100,000 euros for legal entities and up to 1,320 euros for individuals who do not comply with the Law on the Introduction of the Euro.
Unfortunately, the state did not want to timely introduce any register of prices for goods and services (with a historical overview), nor even a blacklist of traders who raise prices, which has proven particularly effective in Slovenia. Therefore, the culprits for the fraud are not (only) the traders, but (also) the authorities.
