After Zagreb and Split, the ‘third paths’ are wide open if the deep state agrees

The expected victory of Ivica Puljak and his Center in the city elections in Split inevitably raises the question: is it possible to replicate the Split model on a national level, in parliamentary elections? Has the moment come for some third path in Croatia to take over the government and manage the state? And what could or should that third path be?

The first answer is simple. Yes, today’s Croatian political scene is indeed ideal for a breakthrough, or at least a relative electoral victory of some ‘third path’. Precisely in the wake of the Split model. Because, the electoral victory of any third path is above all a result of the weakness and political exhaustion of the existing political establishment, not the program of any ‘third path’ party. These are generally protest votes against someone and/or something. And the Croatian political establishment is in deep bankruptcy: SDP is not only in a schism but also in disintegration, HDZ is heading towards a state of political euthanasia, that is, a moment when it will have more members than voters, turning into an ordinary interest group.

Once small, but stable parties like HSLS or HNS are no longer even traceable… And if this trend of establishment collapse and multiplication of parties continues, it could happen that the relative winners of some future elections become – minorities. That the guaranteed eight representatives of national minorities will be enough for a relative majority in the Parliament. Thus, the ‘third paths’ are wide open.

Bankruptcy of the establishment

But the previous Croatian experiences with ‘third paths’ are not at all brilliant. They have often proven to be manufactured satellites of large parties. SDP produced them to retain part of the voters who were leaving it (Labourists, OraH…). HDZ produced them to position itself towards the political center (various right-wing and sovereignist options). Sometimes, like the Living Wall, these ‘third paths’ followed their European anarchist models. But that experiment, fortunately, collapsed on the rocks of personal character and narcissism.

Most managed to stay on the scene the longest, as an eternal opposition to all authorities, including its own, but mainly on trivial matters. The biggest political breakthrough was made by Možemo! winning power in politically neglected Zagreb after Bandić and becoming the loudest opposition to HDZ at the national level. However, when a party whose core consists of radical activists from SDP’s NGOs without any managerial and political experience experiences such a political rise, declassifying the mother party and all others, it is not a sign of their political strength, but of the general bankruptcy of the political establishment.

Croatia is, in fact, in a kind of political-administrative dead end. The previous mainstream paths are neglected, overgrown with (clientelist) moss. The previous ‘third paths’ lead nowhere. And all this is happening in the context of significant changes in the European (and global) order, comparable to the changes that occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and in conditions when the Croatian state administration, which services politics, is becoming unsustainable, when it is bursting at the seams. It is poorly paid, unable to respond to EU demands, and due to the oversight of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, it will no longer be able to meet the wishes of its political employers… And the upcoming energy and general economic crisis will only amplify these effects.

Managers and the deep state

In short, Croatia is ripe for deep political changes; they are, moreover, a necessity. But looking at the current political stage, including the remnants of ‘third paths’, there is no one to implement these changes. Namely, such substantial changes in state management cannot be produced from the existing political pool, although many from that pool can participate in them. Even the Split, Puljak’s branch of the ‘third path’.

For the path to change to be open, a synergy of a managerial approach to political governance and the deep state is necessary, one that has been balancing the roles of HDZ and SDP in leading the state for about thirty years. And which still decisively influences strategic processes. And it is not so only in Croatia. Therefore, instead of answers about yet another Croatian ‘third path’, it is necessary to follow the next moves of Damir Vanđelić and his association Zrin.

They are currently the only ones with the predispositions to become a platform for such a broader gathering for political changes, likely in collaboration with successful mayors and county heads who do not come from HDZ or SDP. But only on the condition that they have the support of the deep state for such an undertaking – both Croatian and some partners. Without such support, it will just be another failed venture of managers into politics. And a step deeper for Croatia.