A few weeks ago, the Association of Members of Mandatory and Voluntary Pension Funds was established with the primary goal of establishing a sober, reasoned, and fact-based dialogue with representatives of the legislature, regulators, and pension fund management companies, with a special emphasis on mandatory pension funds – the so-called second pension pillar (albeit with the inevitable addressing of the issues of the entire pension system), all from the perspective of more than 2 million members who currently manage 126 billion kuna in assets in private accounts.
The intention is to try to offer proposals through a partnership approach that will contribute to incremental changes in order to start creating a system that will provide the possibility of pensions that will deliver greater real purchasing power to future retirees than that enjoyed by current retirees. Part of the challenges related to the existing pension system arises from the small absolute amount that is deducted from salaries for pensions (primarily due to low wages suggesting low economic development) combined with a small relative share of actual investments in operational assets behind which productive activities stand.
‘Good-natured Ponzi scheme’
Namely, within the existing pension system, out of 100 kuna in pension contributions, 75 kuna goes to the so-called first pension pillar and is used for paying pensions to current retirees, while the remaining 25 kuna goes to the mandatory second pension pillar (fund). Contributions to the first pension pillar do not represent an investment as the money is immediately spent and does not generate any return for contributors. The only hope for contributors is that in the future there will be enough people whom the state can compel to contribute to their pensions.
Essentially, although this practice has come to be referred to as ‘generational solidarity’, an alternative name could be ‘good-natured Ponzi scheme’. The problem is that no one can guarantee the existence of a sufficient number of people who will contribute funds in the future and the level of productivity of their work. This is not solely a demographic issue but also involves increased labor mobility in the unified European labor market.
In this sense, part of the solution is sought through ‘private’ investment of the remaining 25 kuna in the second pension pillar. According to existing regulations, citizens have no choice but to allocate funds to one of four mandatory pension funds, which does not encourage competition as mandatory pension funds essentially have a monopoly over these contributions, and the existing structure of investments of mandatory pension funds shows that 60 percent of their assets are in Croatian government bonds, which is not in line with the fundamental principle of diversification in terms of concentration of assets in securities of the same issuer, and the fact that a government bond does not represent an instrument that pays interest (coupon) from inflows generated from productive business activities but from taxes paid by those same investors in pension funds, leading to the paradox that it is in the interest of members of the second pension pillar to achieve the highest possible return at a given level of risk, while at the same time those same members finance the interest that the state pays on bonds through various taxes.
