The real battle for the distribution of influence, power, and money in local government, however, takes place behind these personalized elections for county heads, mayors, and municipal leaders. It becomes most interesting after the elections, when council mandates are tallied and negotiations begin on how to best capitalize on them, how to gain as much power and share of the money and positions revolving around power with a few mandates. The invisible winners of the elections are those who, with just one or two council mandates, control the majority in city councils or county assemblies, thus managing to keep the stability of power in check.
The swing vote as an electoral motive
Becoming that swing vote in forming and maintaining power is actually the greatest electoral motive for small parties and lists, whose number increases with each election. This is the main reason why 10 candidates entered the race for the mayor of Zagreb, eight for the mayor of Osijek, and a record 11 candidates for the mayors of Rijeka and Split, with their parties or lists. This also poses an obstacle to the consolidation of pre-election coalitions between ideologically and politically similar parties or lists, which would prevent the scattering of votes. But the desire is not to win 25 percent and remain in opposition; rather, the desire is to become an indispensable part of power with eight or 10 percent.
What makes local power so attractive? Jobs are created in city/county companies and institutions, and accordingly, they control many positions, from directors to doormen. Various infrastructure projects are built, upgraded, and maintained there, now with generous funding from EU funds. And where power builds, it can also ‘grease its palms’. Private investors and entrepreneurs invest there. And where there is investment, power finds ways to ’embed itself’. After all, local government regulates the business microclimate in its area. Entrepreneurs know best how much this costs them, both in money and nerves. Or alternatively – how much losses it inflicts on them. The anti-corruption office rarely ventures into local levels. It is far from Zagreb. Who knows how many more entrepreneurial Josipas and Gabies would operate unnoticed locally if ambition had not pulled them to the national level? If the anti-corruption office happens to drop by, it will reach the mayor or county head, the director… It will not seek someone who controls processes in the city council, let alone someone who controls two or three mandates there. And what would it find? They sign nothing.
