The historic sporting success of our national football team, no matter how great and exciting, is not on par with two current events that evoke bitterness in me and cannot be washed away. The announcement of pension system reform, or the reactions to it, and the voting on the Agrokor settlement are the results of two strategic decisions, unfortunately, in my opinion, wrong ones, the first in the distant past and the second in the recent past, which are being presented as great successes that solve key societal problems. I consider this a success of wrong processes.
The Agrokor settlement has definitely prevented the correction of one strategic mistake. Among a series of controversial elements, I would single out one that is absurd. We are being shown that the delivery of thirty thousand hectares of the most fertile and valuable state land to foreign capital is actually in the national interest. Even those who shed blood for that land do not protest. Recently, we were almost on the brink of armed conflict with a neighboring and yet friendly country over a few hundred hectares of almost worthless sea bay.
Hysteria Around Pension Changes
There may be hope for the pension system, which is why I will focus more on the so-called pension reform. The almost hysterical reactions to the announced outlines of changes that the ‘expert public’ and, by default, part of the opposition, supported by the main media, glorify the second pension pillar are such that I am surprised by my position of defending a minister. I do not support the entirety of the proposal due to some controversial, perhaps unconstitutional elements, but I believe it was heading in the right direction, towards reducing the detrimental effect of the second pension pillar on the national economy and society, until politics overnight made the first compromise and announced the strengthening of the second pillar to appease opponents, interest groups, and coalition partners, even part of the opposition.
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The introduction of the second pillar is not our idea. This project was discreetly imposed by the World Bank as part of the neoliberal doctrine, and it was enthusiastically accepted by a large part of the expert public who saw their own promotion or mere survival in the academic world in aligning with the ‘mainstream’. Those who warned of many problems and harmful consequences were at best marginalized. However, the main problem is that the theoretical assumptions necessary for such a project to succeed were neglected, and they did not exist.
A surplus of the state pension fund is a necessary assumption, and a surplus of the state budget is also desirable. We had two large deficits, and the realistic prospects for success were minimal. The optimism at the introduction of the second pillar can be somewhat understood due to the then enthusiasm for the market and the postulates of neoclassical economics, but today, after the collapse of those postulates in the previous economic crisis, it is hard to understand those who still insist on it because the numbers are devastating.
How the State Renounced Its Money
Countries that were economically behind us, and today we envy because they have overtaken us, did not embark on such a project or abandoned it very quickly. In Croatia, however, this reform has taken on a pathological form. The state is currently renouncing a significant amount of money, around six billion kuna a year, to reduce its future obligations by about six billion kuna a year, while it will still have to pay that six billion a year in the future, that is, return the borrowed money to the pension funds. Without that money in the present, the state cannot function, so it borrows it from those to whom it has entrusted its management at costs it cannot bear. This is an incestuous relationship in which the state is dealing with itself and is paying dearly for it. However, the interest on such borrowed money is only part of the unnecessary cost to the state.
It can be assumed that the interest on total public and private debt is more than it would be if we had not incurred excessive macroeconomic imbalances and excessive public debt due to contributions to the second pillar. I roughly estimate that the state has so far, along with unnecessary debt greater than 69 billion kuna, which is the net payment to pension funds, paid more than 50 billion kuna in unnecessary interest due to more expensive borrowing, which continues. Of course, to pay that interest, the state had to borrow. Roughly, if the second pension pillar had not been introduced, public debt would be half as much, the economy stronger, and GDP and pensions higher. The problem of pensions has not been solved; rather, it has become even greater.
