Anto Bajo and Davor Galinec, in a recently published Newsletter from the Institute of Public Finance titled Ten Truths About the Procedure for Countries with Excessive Budget Deficits, explain the main provisions of the excessive budget deficit procedure.
Since the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Maastricht criteria establish limits on the growth of public debt and budget deficits, as well as the procedure for countries with excessive budget deficits (EDP) that do not meet the fiscal criteria from Maastricht, the authors believe that the European Commission will likely apply the EDP to Croatia. The reason for this is a higher level of budget deficit than the reference value, as well as rising public debt.
The authors outline the following ten truths, from which we present the most interesting parts.
1. The procedure for countries with excessive budget deficits is introduced for the stabilization of EU member states’ public finances.
According to the Maastricht criteria, the budget deficit of the consolidated general government of a member state must not exceed 3% of GDP, and the general government debt must be 60% of GDP (according to ESA 95 definitions). In the event of exceeding the reference values, the EDP is activated, whose main goal is to ensure that member states comply with the Maastricht criteria.
2. The EDP lasts three years, and according to the recommendations of the European Commission, six months is the deadline for taking action to reduce the deficit.
There are also exceptions, as Bulgaria was in the EDP for two years with the primary goal of reducing the budget deficit because its public debt was low – below the reference value for the application of the EDP. If the targets are not met and appropriate measures are not taken, the EDP can be extended. Thus, in Hungary, exiting the EDP took nine years (from 2004 to 2013).
3. Although the EDP is primarily focused on the budget deficit, it equally applies to public debt.
A member state in the EDP must reduce the gap between the existing level of public debt and the reference level of 60% of GDP by an average of 1/20 annually over the three-year period.
4. The penalties for non-compliance with the EDP are monetary as a percentage of GDP or restrictions on access to structural funds.
Penalties for Eurozone member states are provided in the form of deposits and are set at 0.2% to 0.5% of the GDP of the respective country (in accordance with the provisions of the so-called 6 pack set of EU legal acts). Other EU member states may be temporarily denied withdrawals from EU funds.
5. Fiscal transparency is significant.
If a member state does not comply with the recommendations under the EDP and does not provide reliable statistical data on the budget deficit and public debt expressed according to ESA 95 principles (twice a year, at the end of March and at the end of September), Eurostat (the statistical office of the European Commission) may publicly express so-called “reservations on data quality” and correct the deficit and debt indicators reported by the member state in the EDP report.
